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PROPERTY LAW
Michael V. Hernandez*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys judicial and legislative developments in
Virginia property law from June 1, 2000, to June 1, 2001.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
The Virginia courts decided an unusually large number of
property cases during the past year. Some of the cases involved
important issues, and several included questionable analysis.
This article begins with a discussion of two cases that seem to re-
flect the adage "hard cases make bad law" (or equity, as the case
may be).'
A. Contracts and Deeds
1. Merger/Fraud
In Beck v. Smith,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
whether the provisions of a contract were merged into the deed
and whether the seller's misrepresentations constituted fraud.3
* Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law. B.A., 1984, University of
Virginia, with High Distinction; J.D., 1987, University of Virginia School of Law. I am
very grateful for the editorial assistance provided by my ife, Laura Hernandez, Esquire,
for the research and drafting assistance provided by Erin Malson, and for the editing and
citation assistance provided by the staff of the University of Richmond Law Review.
1. See McClellan v. Ashley, 200 Va. 38, 44, 104 S.E.2d 55, 60 (1958) (quoting Moore
v. Pierson, 6 Iowa 278, 296 (1858) ("Hard cases must not be allowed to make bad equity
any more than bad law.")).
2. 260 Va. 452, 538 S.E.2d 312 (2000).
3. Id. at 454, 538 S.E.2d at 313.
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Beck contracted to purchase property from Smith, who was aware
that Beck planned to build a house on the lot.4 The contract obli-
gated Smith to provide a general warranty deed subject to utility
easements that did not "materially and adversely effect [sic] the
Purchaser's intended use of the Property."5 Despite this provision,
three days before closing Smith conveyed to an electric coopera-
tive an easement across the portion of the land upon which Beck
planned to build a house.6 Although Beck hired an attorney to do
a title search, neither the attorney nor Smith told Beck about the
easement prior to the settlement.7 The warranty deed Beck ac-
cepted at closing provided that the conveyance was made subject
to any easements of record.' When the electric cooperative subse-
quently began constructing a transmission line across the ease-
ment, Beck filed a motion for judgment against Smith alleging
breach of contract and fraud.'
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled for Beck on the contract
claim but not on the fraud claim. ° Regarding the alleged breach
of contract, the court held that the easement provision in the con-
tract was collateral to the deed and thus not merged into it." The
court noted that, generally, real estate contracts are merged into,
and thus do not survive, the deed.'2 However, a contract provision
is collateral to the deed and thus still enforceable if it: (1) is a dis-
tinct agreement; (2) does not affect the title to the property; (3) is
not addressed in the deed; and (4) does not conflict with the
deed." Without analysis, the court asserted that the easement
provision in the contract satisfied the collateral provision excep-
tion and concluded that Beck could sue Smith for breach of con-
tract.14 The court held, however, that because Beck's attorney
should have discovered the recorded easement, the attorney's ac-
tual or constructive knowledge was imputed to Beck. 5 Thus, Beck
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 454, 538 S.E.2d at 313-14.
7. Id. at 454, 538 S.E.2d at 314.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 454-55, 538 S.E.2d at 314.
10. Id. at 458, 538 S.E.2d at 316.
11. Id. at 456, 538 S.E.2d at 315.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 457, 538 S.E.2d at 315.
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could not claim detrimental reliance on Smith's misrepresenta-
tions or recover damages for fraud. 6
Although the court's analysis of the fraud issue may have been
sound, its contract analysis was questionable. The easement pro-
vision was clearly not collateral to the deed and thus should have
been considered merged into it. Because the four criteria for the
collateral provision exception are written in the conjunctive
"and," all four must be satisfied for the exception to apply.17 None
of the four elements was truly met in this case.
First, the court erroneously asserted that the easement provi-
sion did not affect the title to the property. Although the lack of
analysis in the opinion makes it impossible to know why the court
reached this conclusion, 8 the court apparently based its conclu-
sion on the fact that Beck obtained a fee simple estate despite the
existence of the easement. 9 While it is true that an easement
does not preclude the conveyance of title,2" this does not mean
that the easement has no bearing on the title conveyed. To the
contrary, the court overlooked the fact that one of the English
covenants of title is the covenant against encumbrances,2 and an
easement is an encumbrance.22 The mere fact that the covenant
against encumbrances is a covenant of title shows that the exis-
tence of the easement in Beck is related to the title at issue.
Therefore, the first element for the collateral provision exception
was not truly met.
Second, although the contract explicitly stated that no utility
easements could be inconsistent with Beck's intended use of the
land, the deed conversely obligated Beck to accept all easements
16. Id. at 457, 538 S.E.2d at 315-16.
17. See id. at 456, 538 S.E.2d at 315.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 454, 538 S.E.2d at 313-14.
20. See, e.g., Greenan v. Solomon, 252 Va. 50, 54, 472 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1996) (holding
that an easement does not change who has title to the land or prevent title from passing);
Scott v. Albemarle Horse Show Ass'n, 128 Va. 517, 531, 104 S.E. 842, 846 (1920) (holding
that an easement does not affect the freehold interest in the servient estate).
2L See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-70 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001); §§ 55-72, 55-74
(Repl. Vol. 1995).
22. See Thompson v. Shaw Real Estate, Inc., 210 Va. 714, 716, 173 S.E.2d 812, 814
(1970). See generally WILLIAm B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHrImAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 11.13 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the covenant against encumbrances and noting that an
easement is a typical encumbrance).
2001]
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of record.23 Thus, the remaining three elements for the exception
were not met because: (1) the easement provision in the contract
did not address distinct subject matter; (2) the issue of easements
was explicitly addressed in the deed; and (3) the contract and the
deed were in direct conflict.' Although the court's sympathy for
Beck was understandable, it should have held, as the trial court
did, that the contract provision was merged into the deed and
thus did not survive." Moreover, the contract included a merger
clause that explicitly stated that no contractual warranties would
survive settlement.
2. Execution
In Brooks v. Lum,27 the Winchester Circuit Court considered
whether a notarized document conveyed property." The owner of
the property, Mrs. Rowe, was disabled.29 For many years, Mrs.
Rowe's brother, H.M. Brooks, took care of her and her only son,
Henri Rowe.3" Mrs. Rowe and her son were estranged during the
last eight years of her life, and he did not attend her funeral.3'
Brooks prepared a document that Mrs. Rowe executed six years
before her death, which provided in pertinent part:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
Because of my sudden illness and I am not sure what I will have to
face in the days to come, I want to make sure that my brother, H.M.
Brooks, will be paid for what he has done for me over the long span
of fifty years or more.... I hereby pay him for these services ren-
dered in the form of all of my personal and real property regardless
of where it may be located .... P2
When Mrs. Rowe executed this document, she referred to it as
23. See id. at 454, 538 S.E.2d at 313-14.
24. Id. at 456, 538 S.E.2d at 315.
25. See id. at 455, 538 S.E.2d at 314.
26. Id.
27. 52 Va. Cir. 390 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Winchester City).
28. See id. at 392.
29. Id. at 391.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
PROPERTY LAW
a letter.33 Brooks first testified that when he prepared the docu-
ment, he did not think it was a deed, but he later alleged during
the course of litigation that it was a deed.34 Brooks kept the
document but never recorded it. 5 He also managed the property
and paid all related bills and taxes.36 After Mrs. Rowe died intes-
tate, Henri claimed the property as her sole heir, and he later
conveyed it to Lum.37
Brooks filed suit, claiming that the document he prepared for
Mrs. Rowe conveyed title to Brooks, even though it was not in the
form of a deed and was never recorded." The circuit court noted
that deeds are to be liberally construed and need not be in any
particular form so long as they manifest the intent to transfer a
property interest.39 The court held that the document conveyed
title to Brooks.4 ° The Brooks court distinguished the recent Su-
preme Court of Virginia opinion in Lim v. Choi,4 which held that
a poorly drafted memorandum did not convey title because it did
not include words of conveyance or otherwise manifest the intent
to transfer an interest.42
The holding in Brooks is difficult to justify in light of the facts
of the case and the decision in Lim. While it is true that deeds
should be liberally construed to effectuate the parties' intent to
convey a property interest,43 that rule presumes that the parties
33. Id. at 392.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 392-93.
38. Id. at 392.
39. Id. at 393-94.
40. Id. at 399.
41. 256 Va. 167, 501 S.E.2d 141 (1998); see also Michael V. Hernandez, Annual Survey
of Virginia Law: Property Law, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 981, 995 (2000) (analyzingLim).
42. Lim, 256 Va. at 168, 501 S.E.2d at 142. The memorandum in Lim provided:
I purchased the above property.., jointly with Mr. Soo-Myung Choi as a co-
owner. However, I hereby state that the ownership of the above prop-
erty... is not the nature of thing for which I assume responsibility in paying
mortgage.
In the event that Mr. Soo-Myung Choi sells or rents the above house and
needs my signature for the release, I will gladly and without delay respond to
the occasion.
I hereby make it clear ... that all rights belong to Mr. Soo-Myung Choi alone.
Id. at 169, 501 S.E.2d at 142.
43. Brooks, 52 Va. Cir. at 393 (citing Albert v. Holt, 137 Va. 5, 9-10, 119 S.E. 120, 122
20011
782 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:777
intended the document to be a deed and to pass a property inter-
est.44 In Brooks, although the parties may have intended to con-
vey a property interest, neither party considered the document to
be a deed.45 Furthermore, Brooks never treated the document as
an instrument of conveyance, as evidenced by his failure to record
it.46 Although the memorandum in Lim contained conflicting pro-
visions,47 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the memoran-
dum did not convey a property interest despite its statement that
it was "clear" that "all rights" to the property "hereby" belong to
the memorandum's recipient "alone."' The Winchester Circuit
Court apparently based its decision on its view that Brooks was a
worthier owner than Henri Rowe, who had forsaken his mother at
the end of her life. The court concluded that Brooks was "a man of
considerable accomplishment"49 and heavily emphasized Brooks'
provision for his sister and her son.50
3. Condition of Premises/Termite Damage
In Davis v. Relocation Properties Management,"' the purchaser,
Davis, sought compensation from the seller, Relocation Properties
Management ("RPM"), for wood infestation damage.52 The con-
tract contained preprinted, boilerplate language warranting that
the property was free from visible termite damage, obligating the
seller to provide a termite report and to pay for any extermina-
tion and repairs, and noting that the seller was buying the prop-
erty "as is," except as otherwise provided. 3 One contract provi-
sion stated that any handwritten or typewritten additions would
control over conflicting preprinted provisions.54 The handwritten
(1923)).
44. Id. at 394.
45. Id. at 392.
46. Id.
47. See Lim, 256 Va. at 169, 501 S.E.2d at 142. In Lim, the memorandum indicated
that the drafter only wanted to avoid responsibility for a mortgage, but it also indicated
that the property belonged to the other party alone. Id.
48. Id. at 169, 172, 501 S.E.2d at 142, 144.
49. Brooks, 52 Va. Cir. at 390.
50. Id. at 391.
51. 53 Va. Cir. 215 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Spotsylvania County).
52. Id. at 215.
53. Id. at 216.
54. Id.
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provisions in the contract provided that RPM was a non-resident
owner with no knowledge of the condition of the premises except
that obtained through inspections and reports, and reiterated
that the buyer was purchasing the property "as is."55 Prior to clos-
ing, RPM provided Davis a report from a termite company certify-
ing that the property was free of any visible evidence of infesta-
tion.56 However, when Davis discovered extensive infestation
shortly after the closing, he sued RPM, alleging violations of the
Virginia Residential Property Disclosure Act57 ("Disclosure Act"),
the Virginia Consumer Protection Act," and breach of contract.5 9
The court rejected all three claims.6" First, it held that there
was no breach of contract because the handwritten provisions
conflicted with, and thereby controlled over, the preprinted ter-
mite warranty provision.6' Second, it held that RPM did not vio-
late the Disclosure Act because RPM made an appropriate dis-
claimer by noting in the contract that it was a non-resident owner
dependent entirely on others' reports.62 The court further held
that RPM did not violate the Disclosure Act because it delivered a
report to Davis from a licensed termite expert.63 Finally, the court
dismissed Davis' claim under the Virginia Consumer Protection
Act because there were no false promises or misrepresentations
in the contract.'
Although the court's statutory analysis was sound, its contrac-
tual analysis ran counter to the facts of the case. In the handwrit-
ten provision, RPM simply disavowed any actual knowledge of
termite damage or any basis for constructive knowledge other
than reports prepared by others.65 Despite the court's assumption
to the contrary, this provision did not directly contradict RPM's
obligation to warrant against visible damage. If in fact such dam-
55. Id.
56. Id. at 218.
57. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-517 to -525 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
58. Id. §§ 59.1-196 to -207 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
59. Davis, 53 Va. Cir. at 215.
60. Id. at 219.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 216, 218.
63. Id. at 218.
64. Id. at 218-19.
65. See id. at 216.
20011
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age existed, then arguably RPM breached the contract, notwith-
standing the termite company's obviously flawed inspection re-
port.
B. Landlord!Tenant
1. Landlord's Liability for Criminal Assault by Third Party
Against Tenant
In Yuzefovsky v. St. John's Wood Apartments,6 a tenant who
was assaulted on the landlord's property sued the landlord, as-
serting various tort claims.67 Prior to leasing, Yuzefovsky had in-
quired about the safety of the complex, and complex employees
made several misrepresentations that allegedly induced Yuze-
fovsky to sign a lease.6" Twenty-one months later, Yuzefovsky was
shot by an assailant, who then stole Yuzefovsky's car from the
premises.69 Yuzefovsky alleged that, contrary to the complex em-
ployees' representations, several hundred crimes had occurred
both in the vicinity of and on the complex in recent years.7 0 Yuze-
fovsky sued, alleging fraud, negligent failure to warn, and negli-
gent failure to protect. 1 He based his failure to warn and protect
claims on his alleged special relationship with the landlord."
Regarding the fraud count, the court held that, although the
employees' misstatements were fraudulent misrepresentations of
fact, the assault by the third party was remote in time from the
execution of the contract and, thus, the fraudulent inducement
did not proximately cause Yuzefovsky's damages. 3 With respect
to the claims of failure to warn and to protect, the court noted
that generally an owner or occupier of land is not liable for inju-
ries caused by the criminal act of a third party.7 4 However, an ex-
ception applies where there is a special relationship either be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant or between the defendant
66. 261 Va. 97, 540 S.E.2d 134 (2001).
67. Id. at 101, 540 S.E.2d at 136.
68. Id. at 102-03, 540 S.E.2d at 137.
69. Id. at 103, 540 S.E.2d at 137.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 101, 103-04, 540 S.E.2d at 136-38.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 110-12, 540 S.E.2d at 142-43.
74. Id. at 106, 540 S.E.2d at 139-40.
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and the criminal actor, and where the risk of harm is so foresee-
able that the defendant has a duty to warn or protect the plain-
tiff.75 The court held that the typical landlord/tenant arrangement
alone does not constitute such a special relationship, and, there-
fore, a landlord is generally not an insurer of a tenant's safety.76
Without determining whether the facts gave rise to a special rela-
tionship between Yuzefovsky and St. John's Wood, the court held
that St. John's Wood had no duty to warn or protect Yuzefovsky
against the assault.77 Generally, a business owner "'does not have
a duty to take measures to protect an invitee against criminal as-
sault unless he knows that criminal assaults against persons are
occurring, or are about to occur, on the premises which indicate
an imminent probability of harm to an invitee."'' 8 The court de-
termined that
[tihere are no express allegations... that St. John's Wood knew
that criminal assaults against persons were occurring, or were about
to occur, on the premises that would indicate an imminent probabil-
ity of harm to Yuzefovsky....
... Because Yuzefovsky had resided at the property of St. John's
Wood for approximately one year and nine months before he was in-
jured, we hold that there is no basis to impose a continuing duty to
warn [or to protect] against a danger that was not imminent.
79
In Miller v. Charles E. Smith Management, Inc.,"° a diversity
action arising from the murder of a tenant in the parking lot of an
apartment complex,8' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit recently applied the fraud analysis in Yuze-
fovsky" The tenant's estate alleged that the complex's employees
made false representations about the safety of the premises,
which induced the tenant to rent a unit and proximately caused
her death four months later.8 3 The Fourth Circuit held that Yuze-
fovsky mandated dismissal of Miller's fraud claim because the
75. Id. at 107-09, 540 S.E.2d at 139-41.
76. Id. at 108, 540 S.E.2d at 140.
77. Id. at 109, 540 S.E.2d at 140-41.
78. Id. at 109, 540 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting Wright v. Webb, 234 Va. 527, 533, 362
S.E.2d 919, 922 (1987)).
79. Id. at 109-10, 540 S.E.2d at 141 (emphasis added).
80. No. 00-1391, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7977 (4th Cir. May 2, 2001) (unpublished de-
cision).
8L Id. at '2.
82. Id. at:5.
83. Id. at *2.
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misrepresentations were too remote from the criminal activity to
give rise to a claim in tort. 4
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit's superficial analysis makes
it difficult to determine whether the court properly interpreted
and applied Yuzefovsky. The Fourth Circuit simply assumed that,
if the twenty-one month gap between the misrepresentations and
the assault in Yuzefovsky made the resulting damages too remote
for recovery, then the four-month gap in Miller was likewise too
remote.85 However, in Yuzefovsky, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the fraud must relate to a present or pre-existing fact. 6
It also emphasized the significance of the length of time that
passed between the fraudulent statements and the assault.8 ' The
Fourth Circuit should have more thoroughly considered the na-
ture and extent of the knowledge the apartment complex's agents
had about criminal activity at the site, particularly any knowl-
edge the agents may have had about the assailants. Yuzefovsky
does not stand for the proposition that a four-month gap between
fraudulent inducement and a criminal assault is presumptively
too remote to give rise to liability in tort.
2. "Time is of the Essence" for Renewal
A recent Richmond Circuit Court decision, HCA Health Ser-
vices of Virginia, Inc. v. Bank of America," exposed ambiguities
in Virginia law regarding whether time is of the essence in re-
newing a lease. In Selden v. Camp, 9 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that a lessee who did not give timely notice could nev-
ertheless renew a ninety-nine year lease.9" The lessee had
otherwise complied with the lease, and the lease and the parties'
course of dealing did not suggest that time was of the essence.9
Noting that equity generally does not consider time to be of the
84. Id. at *7.
85. Id.
86. See Yuzefovsky, 261 Va. at 110-11, 540 S.E.2d at 142.
87. Id.
88. No. HN-2230-4, 2001 WL 300594 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 2001) (Richmond City),
appeal denied, No. 011310 (Va. Sept. 12, 2001).
89. 95 Va. 527, 28 S.E. 877 (1898).
90. Id. at 531, 28 S.E. at 878.
91. Id. at 529-31, 28 S.E. at 878.
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essence for the renewal of a lease,92 the court in Selden summed
up the controlling principle of law as follows:
In determining the right of the lessee to renew ... the question to be
considered is, has the party asking for relief been guilty of gross neg-
ligence, or is the default relied on the result of mere negligence....
"When the terms of an agreement have not been strictly complied
with,... if there has not been gross negligence in the party, and it is
conscientious that the agreement should be performed, and if com-
pensation can be made for any injury occasioned by the non-
compliance with the strict terms, in all such cases courts of equity
will interfere, and decree specific performance; for the doctrine of
courts of equity is not forfeiture but compensation, and nothing but
such a decree will in such cases do entire justice between the par-
ties."
93
In Berkow v. Hammer,94 the Supreme Court of Virginia later
cited Selden with approval, but held that its rationale did not ap-
ply to a short-term lease, such as Hammer's five-year lease with
an option to renew.95 In two subsequent cases, however, the court,
without mentioning Selden, held that equity would deny relief to
the lessee where the failure to give notice of the intent to renew is
due solely to the lessee's negligence.96
In HCA Health Services, a case involving a late renewal of a
thirty-year lease, the Richmond Circuit Court attempted to har-
monize the supreme court's precedent. The lessee, HCA, argued
that its renewal notice was effective because the lease did not
specify that time was of the essence, and the lessor would be un-
justly enriched by substantial improvements the lessee had made
to the property." The circuit court rejected HCA's argument for
several reasons.99 First, the court held that Selden did not stand
for the proposition that time is never of the essence in long-term
92. Id. at 531, 28 S.E. at 878.
93. Id. at 531-32, 28 S.E. at 878 (citation omitted).
94. 189 Va. 489, 53 S.E.2d 1 (1949).
95. See id. at 496, 498, 500, 53 S.E.2d at 4, 6.
96. See Sentara Enters. v. CCP Assocs., 243 Va. 39, 413 S.E.2d 595 (1992) (holding
that time was of the essence in the case of an attempted renewal of a three-year lease);
McClellan v. Ashley, 200 Va. 38, 104 S.E.2d 55 (1958) (holding the same in a case involv-
ing an original two-year lease).
97. No. HN-2230-4, 2001 WL 300594 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 2001) (Richmond City),
appeal denied, No. 011310 (Va. Sept. 12, 2001).
98. Id. at *2.
99. See id. at *6-7.
2001]
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leases.' Instead, the court limited the holding in Selden to its
facts, specifically that the lessor routinely accepted late pay-
ments, and thus the parties' course of dealing established that
time was generally not of the essence.'' This reading of Selden is,
at best, curious. Although Selden was based in part on the par-
ties' course of dealings, °2 that opinion also stated:
Mere default in the payment of money at a stipulated time admits
generally of compensation, and hence time of payment is seldom
treated as essential in contracts in respect to real estate. That time
was not of the essence of these contracts seems plain. It is not usu-
ally so considered in equity, and there is nothing in the leases to show
that the parties so regarded it.
103
Selden, therefore, suggests that time is presumptively not of the
essence for any lease or other real estate contract. According to
this view, the lease must explicitly state that time is of the es-
sence.
0 4
Second, the circuit court in HCA Health Services held that the
more recent Supreme Court of Virginia decisions, consistent with
the general trend in landlord/tenant law, did not recognize a dis-
tinction between a long-term and a short-term lease for determin-
ing whether time is of the essence in lease renewals.0 5 Although
the circuit court's premise is true, its conclusion is debatable. In
its two most recent decisions, the Supreme Court of Virginia did
not discuss the distinction between a long-term and a short-term
lease. '6 However, the court did not have to address the law gov-
erning long-term leases because both cases clearly involved short-
term leases.' 7 Neither case repudiated the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia's earlier distinction between a long-term and a short-term
lease. ' Indeed, the earlier case followed the previous opinion,
100. Id. at *6.
101. Id.
102. Selden v. Camp, 95 Va. 527, 531, 28 S.E. 877, 878 (1898).
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. See id.
105. HCA Health Servs., 2001 WL 300594, at *7.
106. See generally Sentara Enters., 243 Va. 39, 413 S.E.2d 595 (1992); McClellan, 200
Va. 38, 104 S.E.2d 55 (1958).
107. See Sentara Enters., 243 Va. at 41, 413 S.E.2d at 595 (original three-year lease);
McClellan, 200 Va. at 39, 104 S.E.2d at 56 (original two-year lease).
108. See Berkow v. Hammer, 189 Va. 489, 498-99, 53 S.E.2d 1, 5-6 (1949) (distinguish-
ing Selden in part because it did not address short-term leases). See generally Sentara En-
ters., 243 Va. at 44-45, 413 S.E.2d at 597-98 (applying McClellan); McClellan, 200 Va. at
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which distinguished long-term and short-term leases.10 9 Because
a court should not assume an opinion overrules prior precedent
by implication, 10 the circuit court arguably erred by assuming
that the Supreme Court of Virginia implicitly rejected its previ-
ous distinction between different types of leases.
Third, the court held in HCA Health Services that, even if such
a distinction did apply, the thirty-year lease with three ten-year
renewal options was a short-term lease."' This holding is highly
questionable because the Supreme Court of Virginia recently
treated a fifteen-year commercial lease with two five-year re-
newal options as a long-term lease."' Finally, noting that these
sophisticated parties had negotiated at arm's length, the court re-
jected HCA's assertion that a forfeiture would be inequitable in
this case. 1 3
Shortly before this article went to print, the Supreme Court of
Virginia denied a petition for appeal in HCA Health Services."'
The interesting and important issues in this case, including the
trial court's questionable reading of Virginia law, suggest the su-
preme court should have granted the petition. The supreme court
should have taken the opportunity to clarify whether time is of
the essence when exercising renewal options and whether a dis-
tinction should continue to be made between long and short-term
leases. If the court reaffirms this distinction in a subsequent case,
42-44, 104 S.E.2d at 58-59 (applying Berkow).
109. See McClellan, 200 Va. at 42-44, 104 S.E.2d at 58-59 (citing Berkow, 189 Va. at
497-98, 53 S.E.2d at 5).
110. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) ("We do not acknowledge,
and we do not hold, that other courts should conclude our more recent cases have, by im-
plication, overruled an earlier precedent .... '[I]f a precedent of [a higher court] has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of deci-
sions, the [lower court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to [the
higher court] the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.'") (quoting Rodriguez de Qui-
jas v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)); In re Morrissey, 168 F.3d
134, 139-40 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[A] precedent ... overruled through a court's silence is a dis-
favored enterprise."), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1036 (1999); Jaekel v. Equifax Mktg. Decisions
Sys., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Va. 1992) ("Where two valid rules co-exist, it not
[sic] the province of this Court, in the first instance, to exalt one over the other. Rather,
the Court must first attempt to reconcile them in a meaningful and reasonable manner.").
111. HCA Health Servs., 2001 WL 300594, at *7.
112. See Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Hopper, 245 Va. 363, 429 S.E.2d 6 (1993) (holding
that the rule against perpetuities did not apply to the lease).
113. HCA Health Servs., 2001 WL 300594, at *7.
114. HCA Health Servs. of Va., Inc. v. Bank of Am., No. 011310 (Va. Sept. 12, 2001)
(denying petition for appeal).
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it must explain how to distinguish long and short-term leases.
The trial court's questionable finding that a thirty-year lease with
three ten-year renewal options was a short-term lease also should
have warranted appellate review.
3. Tenant's Liability for Subtenant's Negligence
In Wallace v. Dramberger,"5 the Roanoke Circuit Court held
that a tenant was liable to the landlord for breach of contract, but
not for negligence, due to a subtenant's actions that caused fire
damage to the premises."' The court based its negligence ruling
on the fact that, absent a special relationship or statutorily im-
posed duty, the tenant could not be vicariously liable to the land-
lord for the negligence of the subtenant."7 Regarding the contract
claim, the court, citing the Supreme Court of Virginia's decision
in Jones v. Dokos Enterprises,"' held that, after the execution of
the sublease, the tenant was in privity of contract but not in priv-
ity of possession with the landlord and thus could be sued only on
the basis of privity of contract." 9
Although the court reached the correct conclusion on the con-
tract claim, it misread Jones, which involved an assignment, not
a sublease. 2 ° When a tenant assigns a lease, the tenant remains
in privity of contract with the landlord,'2 ' but the assignee and
the landlord are then in privity of estate.'22 By contrast, when a
tenant subleases the premises, the tenant remains in both privity
of contract and estate with the landlord 2 because the tenant re-
tains a reversion in the leasehold.'24 Given that Wallace involved
a sublease, the court should have held that the tenant was liable
based on both privity of contract and estate.
115. 53 Va. Cir. 383 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Roanoke City).
116. Id. at 384-85.
117. Id.
118. 233 Va. 555, 357 S.E.2d 203 (1987).
119. Wallace, 53 Va. Cir. at 384 (citing Jones, 233 Va. 555, 357 S.E.2d 203).
120. See Jones, 233 Va. at 557, 357 S.E.2d at 204-05.
121. Id. at 557, 357 S.E.2d at 205; cf Pollard & Bagby, Inc. v. Pierce Arrow, L.L.C., 258
Va. 524, 529, 521 S.E.2d 761, 763-64 (1999) (holding that a landlord's assignee assumed
all of the contractual obligations of the landlord to the tenant). For further discussion of
Pollard & Bagby, see Hernandez, supra note 41, at 1001.
122. Jones, 233 Va. at 557, 357 S.E.2d at 205.
123. JoHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 18.04 (2000).
124. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 22, § 6.68.
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C. Zoning
1. Discrimination
In Board of Supervisors v. McDonald's Corp.,25 the Supreme
Court of Virginia rejected a claim that the Fairfax County Board
of Supervisors had illegally discriminated against McDonald's by
denying it permission to build a drive-through facility even
though the Board had simultaneously approved other drive-
through restaurants nearby. 126 The court based its holding on the
fact that a governing body can overcome evidence of disparate
treatment of similar tracts of land by showing that there is a ra-
tional basis for the body's actions. 27 The court listed eight factors
that distinguished the McDonald's property from the other
sites. 28
Although the court's factual distinction of the properties at is-
sue was extensive and arguably persuasive, it is not clear
whether the standard the court adopted for discrimination cases
will allow for many successful claims. This rational basis test is
strikingly similar to the standard that Justice Blackmun of the
United States Supreme Court advocated in his dissenting opinion
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.1 29 According to Jus-
tice Blackmun, in a case where a regulation deprived the land of
all value, the landowner would not be entitled to compensation
for a taking if the governing body could simply articulate a harm-
preventing rationale for its decision.3 ° Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia criticized Justice Blackmun's harm-preventing test:
"Since such a justification can be formulated in practically every
case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stu-
pid staff. We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do more
than insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations."''
No two parcels of land are identical; indeed, the law's prefer-
ence for specific performance in cases of breach of a real estate
125. 261 Va. 583, 544 S.E.2d 334 (2001).
126. Id. at 587-88, 544 S.E.2d at 336-37.
127. Id. at 591, 544 S.E.2d at 339.
128. Id. at 591-93, 544 S.E.2d at 339-40.
129. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
130. Id. at 1047-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 1025 n.12.
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contract is premised on the uniqueness of realty.3 2 Therefore, it
should not be difficult for local governing bodies to avoid claims of
unlawful discrimination by drawing distinctions between simi-
larly situated tracts. Only time will tell if this standard amounts
to nothing more than a test of the creativity of local officials, their
staff, and their counsel.
2. The Dillon Rule
"The Dillon Rule provides that municipal corporations possess
and can exercise only those powers expressly granted by the Gen-
eral Assembly, those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and
those that are essential and indispensable."'33 In Adams Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals,34 the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that Virginia Code sections 15.2-2201131
and 15.2-2309,36 which only authorize variances from "'provisions
regulating the size... of a... parcel of land, or the size, area,
bulk or location of a... structure,"' do not authorize variances
from provisions regulating "the cost to repair nonconforming
structures."37
3. Timing of Appeal/Due Process
In Tran v. Board of Zoning Appeals,38 the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that Virginia Code section 15.2-2312,' which pro-
vides in part that "[t]he [zoning] board shall... make its decision
within ninety days of the filing of the application or appeal,"4 °
was directory and not mandatory.'' The court based its decision
on the fact that the statute contains no prohibitory or limiting
language concerning action after the passage of the ninety-day
132. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 22, § 10.5.
133. City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, Va., Inc., 239 Va. 77, 79, 387
S.E.2d 471, 473 (1990) (citations omitted).
134. 261 Va. 407, 544 S.E.2d 315 (2001).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2201 (Repl. Vol. 1997).
136. Id. § 15.2-2309 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
137. Adams Outdoor Advertising, 261 Va. at 415, 544 S.E.2d at 319.
138. 260 Va. 654, 536 S.E.2d 913 (2000).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2312 (Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Tran, 260 Va. at 658, 536 S.E.2d at 915-16.
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period. 42 The court further held that the board in this case had
not deprived the applicant of due process because the applicant
presented no evidence of prejudice or harm and had not objected
to any of the board's continuances.'
Although the court's holding that the provisions of Virginia
Code section 15.2-2312 are directory and not mandatory is consis-
tent with some Virginia precedent,'" it violates other canons of
statutory construction. All terms of a statute must be interpreted
to have independent meaning'45 and in accordance with their
plain meaning. 46 The court's holding in Tran essentially eviscer-
ates "shall" and rewrites the statute to require the board to make
its decision within a reasonable time. Given that the General As-
sembly could have easily written the statute to make the ninety-
day period discretionary rather than mandatory, it should be pre-
sumed that the legislature intended "shall" to mean what it says.
4. Grandfathering
In Town of Front Royal v. Martin Media,'47 the Supreme Court
of Virginia rejected a landowner's contention that its billboard
was subject to a grandfathering provision in Front Royal's zoning
ordinance."4 The court held that once a locality meets its burden
of showing that a particular use violates a current zoning ordi-
nance, the landowner must prove that the use is a lawful, noncon-
forming use.'49 In Martin Media, the billboard violated the ordi-
nance that was in existence when the billboard was built decades
earlier.' However, neither the landowner nor the town had any
142. Id. at 658, 536 S.E.2d at 916.
143. Id. at 659, 536 S.E.2d at 916.
144. See id. at 657-58, 536 S.E.2d at 915-16 (citing Jamborsky v. Baskins, 247 Va. 506,
511, 442 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1994); Commonwealth v. Rafferty, 241 Va. 319, 324-25, 402
S.E.2d 17, 20 (1991); Fox v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 77, 372 S.E.2d 373, 377 (1988)).
145. See Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998)
("[E]very part [of a statute] is presumed to have some effect and is not to be disregarded
unless absolutely necessary."). See generally NORIAN SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:06 (6th ed. 2000) (noting that terms in a statute should be interpreted
to have independent meaning).
146. Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 370, 514 S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999).
147. 261 Va. 287, 542 S.E.2d 373 (2001).
148. Id. at 295, 542 S.E.2d at 377.
149. Id. at 294, 542 S.E.2d at 376.
150. Id. at 294, 542 S.E.2d at 377.
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records showing whether the town had granted a variance or had
given any other reason to allow the nonconforming billboard to
stand for decades.' 5' Martin Media argued that it should not be
required to locate apparently non-existent town records to vali-
date its use.5 2 The court rejected this argument, holding that be-
cause the landowner must prove the lawfulness of its use, the
landowner has a duty to maintain its own records that will assist
in meeting that burden of proof. 53
5. Constitutionality of Proffered Conditions
In Gwinn v. Jefferson Green Unit Owners Ass'n,' the Fairfax
Circuit Court struck down proffered conditions approved by Fair-
fax County requiring a town home community owners association
to purchase one membership in a private off-site recreation or-
ganization for each unit in the development.'55 The court held
that the conditions violated Article IV, section 14(18) of the Vir-
ginia Constitution, which provides: "The General Assembly shall
not enact any local, special or private law... [g]ranting to any
private corporation, association, or individual any special or ex-
clusive right, privilege, or immunity."5 6
Shortly before this article went to print, the Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed the Fairfax County Circuit Court.'57 The Su-
preme Court rejected the association's argument, which the cir-
cuit court accepted,' that the conditions violated Article IV, sec-
tion 14(18) simply because they benefited a private
organization.'59 The court explained that the controlling test was
whether the conditions bore a reasonable and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation. 6 ' The court determined that the
conditions reasonably and substantially related to the legitimate
151. Id. at 289-94, 542 S.E.2d at 374-77.
152. Id. at 293, 542 S.E.2d at 376.
153. Id. at 293-94, 542 S.E.2d at 376.
154. No. C162197, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 131 (Cir. Ct. July 18, 2000) (Fairfax County)
(unreported decision).
155. Id. at *15.
156. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 14(18); Gwinn, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 131, at *7.
157. Jefferson Green Unit Owners Ass'n v. Gwinn, 551 S.E.2d 339 (Va. 2001).
158. See Gwinn, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 131, at *7.
159. Gwinn, 551 S.E.2d at 345.
160. Id. at 344.
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goal of providing recreational facilities to the residents of Jeffer-
son Green. 6' Although the court followed its earlier "reasonable
and substantial relation" precedent,'62 this decision is difficult to
reconcile with the express language of Article IV, section 14(18),
which does not allow the General Assembly or, by delegation, a
locality to grant a special or exclusive right or privilege to any
private association.'63
6. Standing, Delegation, and Waiver
In Fuentes v. Board of Supervisors,"6 the Fairfax County Board
of Supervisors originally published a report recommending denial
of an application for a special exception to build athletic fields
and related structures on a parcel of land.'65 After the project was
scaled down and subjected to numerous conditions, however, the
Board approved the application. 66 Twenty-seven people who
owned property near the parcel challenged the Board's decision.16
The Fairfax Circuit Court held that the plaintiffs established
standing merely by alleging that they owned property near or ad-
jacent to the parcel. 6 ' The court rejected, however, the plaintiffs'
allegation that the Board's assignment of authority to the local
Health Department to approve a proposed sewage treatment and
disposal system for the site was an unlawful delegation of legisla-
tive power. 69 The court held that this assignment was an essen-
tial delegation of administrative authority.' Finally, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the approval of the project
violated the county's zoning ordinance, holding that the Board's
decision was presumptively correct and that the conditions placed
161. Id. at 345 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2200 (Repl. Vol. 1997 & Cur. Supp. 2001),
which recognizes the need for recreational facilities).
162. See id. at 344 (citing Benderson Dev. Co. v. Sciortino, 236 Va. 136, 147, 372 S.E.2d
751, 757 (1988)).
163. VA. CONST. Art. IV, § 14(18).
164. No. 186364, 2000 WL 1210446 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 27, 2000) (Fairfax County).
165. Id. at *1.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *1-2.
168. Id. at *2.
169. Id. at *2-3.
170. Id. at *2.
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on the project had been carefully crafted to ensure compliance
with the ordinance.
1 1
D. Easements
1. Abandonment
In Hudson v. Pillow, 72 the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that, to establish abandonment of an easement, the servient
owner must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, nonuse of
the easement in addition to acts which show an intent to aban-
don. 73 Nonuse alone is not sufficient to establish abandonment. 74
Moreover, evidence that the servient owner required the owner of
the dominant estate to obtain permission to use the right of way
may be relevant to establish abandonment. 75 Deferring to the
chancellor's findings on disputed evidence, the court affirmed the
holding that the prescriptive easement in Hudson had been
abandoned. 176
2. Damages for Blocked Access/Breach of Easement Agreement
In Westerra Reston, L.L.C. v. Walker,177 the Fairfax Circuit
Court decided a case of first impression regarding the intentional
deprivation of easement rights by a business competitor. 178 In
clear violation of an easement agreement between the parties, the
defendant deliberately landlocked the plaintiff in an attempt to
force the plaintiff to sell the land to the defendant.'79 Due to the
defendant's tactics, "the plaintiff was unable to develop or sell
[the land] during a peak real estate market" and "incurred sub-
stantial damages fending off the Defendant's subversive ac-
tions."8 ° Finding no reported Virginia case directly on point, the
171. Id. at *4.
172. 261 Va. 296, 541 S.E.2d 556 (2001).
173. Id. at 302, 541 S.E.2d at 560.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 303, 541 S.E.2d at 561.
176. Id. at 302-04, 541 S.E.2d at 560-61.
177. No. 164601, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 158 (Cir. Ct. June 2, 2000) (Fairfax County).
178. See id. at *2.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *3.
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court looked to basic principles of contract law to determine the
appropriate measure of damages. 181 The court awarded the plain-
tiff $1,032,782 plus interest in damages for lost investment prof-
its and for land maintenance expenses during the time of the de-
fendant's interference. 18
2
E. Restrictive Covenants
In Leeman v. Troutman Builds, Inc.,'83 the Supreme Court of
Virginia examined a restrictive covenant that limited a lot in a
development to one dwelling unless the vendor agreed otherwise
in writing."s The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the cove-
nant was enforceable even though the vendor no longer existed
and thus could not provide written permission to waive the dwell-
ing restriction."8 5 The court also held that summary judgment
was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the covenant was intended to be a personal
covenant or a restrictive covenant running with the land.8 6
F. Riparian Rights
In Smith Mountain Lake Yacht Club, Inc. v. Ramaker,'8 1 the
Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the owner of prop-
erty adjacent to Smith Mountain Lake had the riparian right to
build a dock over partially submerged property. 88 The Smith
Mountain Lake Yacht Club held a deed to the property at issue
that was part of the land flooded to create the lake.8 9 The prop-
erty owners claimed that Virginia Code section 28.2-1200 vested
title in the Commonwealth, 9 ° while the Yacht Club claimed it
181. Id. at *2-5.
182. Id. at *6-11.
183. 260 Va. 202, 530 S.E.2d 909 (2000).
184 Id. at 204, 530 S.E.2d at 910.
185. Id. at 206-07, 530 S.E.2d at 911-12.
186. Id. at 207-09, 530 S.E.2d at 912-13.
187. 261 Va. 240, 542 S.E.2d 392 (2001).
188. Id. at 242, 542 S.E.2d at 393.
189. Id. at 243, 542 S.E.2d at 394.
190. The Virginia Code provides:
All the beds of the bays, rivers, creeks and the shores of the sea within the ju-
risdiction of the Commonwealth, not conveyed by special grant or compact ac-
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still owned the submerged land.'9' The court held that, under the
statutory construction principle expressio unius est exclusio alte-
rius,192 Virginia Code section 28.2-12009' did not mention lakes
and thus did not apply to them.'94 The court accordingly held that
the property owners had no riparian rights in the lake and thus
could not build the dock without the Yacht Club's permission.'95
In Carr v. Kidd, '96 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that an
apportionment of riparian rights should be made based on the
historic, rather than current, mean low water line.'97 The court
based this ruling on the need to ensure that owners do not in-
crease their riparian rights by developing their own shoreline.'98
The Allegheny Circuit Court also addressed the law of riparian
rights during the last year. In Wilson v. Dressier,'99 "[a] spring
creek... originate[d] on Wilson's property, flow[ed] onto
Dressler's property where a containment pond was built for wa-
tering cattle... [and] then naturally flow[ed] back onto Wilson's
property."20 0 When Dressler diverted most of the flow to his con-
tainment pond, Wilson sought an injunction requiring Dressler to
return the flow to his riparian land downstream.2 ' The court held
that the water "qualifi[ed] as a stream and [was] subject to ripar-
ian rights."20 2 The court rejected Dressler's contention that Wilson
was not deprived of riparian rights because he had use of the
stream before it entered Dressler's property, holding that Wilson
cording to law, shall remain the property of the Commonwealth and may be
used as a common by all the people of the Commonwealth for the purpose of
fishing, fowling, hunting, and taking and catching oysters and other shellfish.
VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1200 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
191. Ramaker, 261 Va. at 245, 542 S.E.2d at 395.
192. This principle establishes "that the mention of a specific item in a statute implies
that other omitted items were not intended to be included within the scope of the statute."
Id. at 246, 542 S.E.2d at 395 (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 704-05, 529
S.E.2d 96, 100 (2000); Bd. of Supervisors v. Wilson, 250 Va. 482, 485, 463 S.E.2d 650, 652
(1995); Turner v. Wexler, 244 Va. 124, 127, 418 S.E.2d 886, 887 (1992)).
193. VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-1200 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
194. Ramaker, 261 Va. at 246, 542 S.E.2d at 395.
195. Id. at 249, 542 S.E.2d at 397.
196. 261 Va. 81, 540 S.E.2d 884 (2001).
197. See id. at 93, 540 S.E.2d at 891-92.
198. Id. at 92, 540 S.E.2d at 891.
199. 52 Va. Cir. 410 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Allegheny County).
200. Id. at 411.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 412.
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had a right to have the water flow on all portions of his land that
were riparian. °3 Finally, the court held that the exception allow-
ing a riparian owner to diminish the flow of a stream to water
cattle did not apply because Dressler had other sources of water
from which his cattle could drink.2 °4
G. Eminent Domain
In Russell v. Commissioner, °5 a sharply divided Supreme
Court of Virginia held that an appraiser's prior tax evaluation
could be used as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the
appraiser's testimony about the current fair market value of the
property. 6 Three justices dissented based on the different pur-
poses and methodologies inherent in the two assessments.2 °7 Spe-
cifically, the dissenters noted that the purpose of a tax assess-
ment is to set uniform, rather than exact, values, while the
purpose of determining fair market value in a condemnation pro-
ceeding is to provide full compensation for the property taken.2 8
In Gray & Gregory v. GTE South, Inc. ,209 the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that evidence of the rental income generated by
taken property is a relevant factor in establishing the property's
fair market value.210
H. Tax Assessments
In Board of Supervisors v. HCA Health Services of Virginia,
Inc.,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Fairfax
County Board of Supervisors' tax assessment of a hospital was
not presumptively correct because the Board relied solely on the
depreciated reproduction cost method without first considering
203. Id. at 412-13.
204. Id. at 413.
205. 261 Va. 617, 544 S.E.2d 311 (2001).
206. Id. at 620-21, 544 S.E.2d at 313-14 (4-3 decision).
207. Id. at 621-24, 544 S.E.2d at 314-15 (Keenan, J., dissenting). Justices Hassell and
Koontz joined Justice Keenan's dissent. Id. at 621, 544 S.E.2d at 314.
208. Id. at 622-23, 544 S.E.2d at 314 (Keenan, J., dissenting).
209. 261 Va. 67, 540 S.E.2d 498 (2001).
210. Id. at 71-72, 540 S.E.2d at 500-01.
211. 260 Va. 317, 535 S.E.2d 163 (2000).
20011
800 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:777
and properly rejecting other methods.212 Because the assessment
was not presumptively correct, the standard of proof that applied
to the property owner was whether the assessment was errone-
ous, not the higher manifestly erroneous standard. 13 The court
affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the board's assessment
was erroneous due in part to the board's failure to consider cur-
rent market value, including factors in the hospital market caus-
ing obsolescence.1 4
I. Condominium Fees
In Homeside Lending, Inc. v. Unit Owners Ass'n of Antietam
Square Condominium,2'5 a condominium association filed a bill of
complaint to enforce liens for unpaid condominium assess-
ments.21 6 The condominium was subject to "a note secured by a
purchase money deed of trust."2 1 7 The Supreme Court of Virginia
held that Virginia Code section 55-79.84(A)211 gives unpaid sums
on first mortgages and deeds of trust priority over liens of a con-
dominium owners' association for unpaid assessments. 219 How-
ever, the court ordered that the fees incurred by the special com-
missioner in chancery were to be paid from the proceeds of the
sale before any distribution of funds to creditors.22 °
212. Id. at 330, 535 S.E.2d at 169-70.
213. Id. at 330, 535 S.E.2d at 170.
214. Id. at 330-33, 535 S.E.2d at 170-71.
215. 261 Va. 161, 540 S.E.2d 894 (2001).
216. Id. at 164, 540 S.E.2d at 894.
217. Id. at 164, 540 S.E.2d at 895.
218. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.84(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
219. Homeside Lending, Inc., 261 Va. at 166-68, 540 S.E.2d at 896-97.
220. Id. at 168, 540 S.E.2d at 897.
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III. LEGISLATION 221
A. Landlord and Tenant
1. Applicability of the VRLTA 22 to All Jurisdictions
During its 2001 session, the Virginia General Assembly made
numerous significant changes to the code provisions governing
landlord and tenant law. The Assembly amended Virginia Code
section 55-248.3:1223 to state that all provisions of the Virginia
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act apply in all the jurisdictions
in the Commonwealth and cannot be waived or modified by local
governments or by the courts.224
2. Duties of Landlord and Tenant
The General Assembly made substantial changes to provisions
governing the duties of both landlords and tenants by adding sec-
tions 55-225.3225 and 55-225.4226 to the Virginia Code. Virginia
Code section 55-225.3 requires the landlord to comply with the
Housing codes, do whatever is necessary to keep the premises fit
and habitable, maintain all facilities and appliances in good and
safe order, and supply running water, hot water, heat, and air
conditioning.2 27 The landlord and tenant may agree in good faith
and in writing, however, that the tenant will perform all the land-
lord's above duties except for keeping the premises in compliance
with all applicable codes.228
Virginia Code section 55-225.4 requires the tenant to comply
with all code provisions applicable to tenants, as well as keep the
221. To view summaries of all changes to Virginia property law enacted during the
2001 General Assembly session, see generally Virginia Legislative Information System, at
http://legl.state.va.us (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
222. Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2 to
-248.40 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
223. Id. § 55-248.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
224. Id.
225. Id. § 55-225.3 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
226. Id. § 55-225.4 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
227. Id. § 55-225.3(A)(1)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
228. Id. § 55.225.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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premises clean and safe, remove all waste, keep all plumbing fix-
tures clean, and to use all appliances and facilities in a reason-
able manner." 9 Further, the tenant must not destroy, deface,
damage, impair, or remove any part of the premises or permit
anyone else to do so, must not tamper with or remove smoke de-
tectors, must not disturb his neighbors' quiet enjoyment, and
must abide by all reasonable rules imposed by the landlord.23 °
3. Security Deposits
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 55-
248.15:1,231 granting the landlord forty-five instead of thirty days
to give the tenant written notice of itemized deductions, damages,
and charges along with the remaining security deposit plus ac-
crued interest after termination of the tenancy and delivery of
possession.232 The Assembly further amended Virginia Code sec-
tion 55-248.15:1(A) to provide that if the landlord willfully fails to
comply with any provision of this section, the court shall, rather
than "may," order the return of the security deposit and interest
to the tenant as well as damages and attorney's fees.233
4. Landlord Access to Premises, Removal of Safety Devices, and
Disruption of Utility Services on Manufactured Home Lots
Landlords must now give twenty-four hour notice of routine
maintenance not requested by the tenant, unless such notice is
impractical.234 The tenant is responsible for any costs the landlord
incurs at the end of the tenancy resulting from the removal of
any safety devices the tenant installed.235 The Assembly also
amended the Manufactured Home Lot Rental Act ("MHLRA")236
to require landlords to give written notice forty-eight hours before
a planned disruption in electric, water, or sewage disposal ser-
237
vices.
229. Id. § 55.225.4(A)(1)-(9) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
230. Id.
231. Id. § 55.248.15:1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
232. Id. § 55.248.15:1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 55-248.18(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
235. Id. § 55-248.18(C)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
236. Id. §§ 55-248.41 to -248.52 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
237. Id. § 55-248.43(5) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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5. Termination
The General Assembly abolished the prior requirement that,
before seeking relief for the landlord's material noncompliance
with the lease or the law, the tenant cannot have received a cer-
tain number of termination notices.238 In addition, section 55-
248.35239 no longer allows a landlord who has regained possession
of the premises to seek a judgment for accelerated rent through
the end of the tenancy." °
The Assembly also amended Virginia Code section 55-248.34,241
which governs the landlord's waiver of the right to terminate a
periodic tenancy. In order for the landlord to preserve his right to
terminate the tenancy for noncompliance after accepting rental
payments, the landlord must, within five business days of the ac-
ceptance of the rental payment, give the tenant written notice of
his reservation of the right to terminate. 2 The Assembly added a
new provision, Virginia Code section 55-248.46:1,43 that codifies
the same requirement under the MHLRA.2
The Assembly amended the MHLRA to require renewal of a
rental agreement for a term of sixty days or more, unless termi-
nation or eviction would be justified, if the landlord and the seller
of the manufactured home have common owners, immediate fam-
ily members, or officers or directors.245
6. Removal of Tenant's Personalty by Sheriff or Landlord
The Assembly added new provisions to the Virginia Code re-
garding the authority of the sheriff and the landlord to sell and
store the tenant's personalty removed from a residence following
an ejectment or action of unlawful detainer. 6 When the personal
property is removed, the sheriff must put the property in the pub-
238. Id § 55-248.27(B)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
239. Id. § 55-248.35 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
240. Id.
241. Id. § 55-248.34 (Cure. Supp. 2001).
242. Id.
243. Id. § 55-248.46:1 (Cure. Supp. 2001).
244. Id.
245. Id. § 55-248.46(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
246. See id. §§ 55-237.1, -248.38:2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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lic way or in a storage area designated by the landlord.24 The
tenant then has twenty-four hours to remove the property.24 The
tenant has the right to access the storage area at reasonable
times during the twenty-four hour period, and he may seek in-
junctive relief if he is kept from his property during this time.249
Neither the landlord nor the sheriff can be held liable for any loss
of the property.2 5 After the twenty-four hour period, the landlord
may remove or dispose of any remaining property.25' If the land-
lord receives any funds from the sale of the property, the landlord
must apply that money to any amounts the tenant owes the land-
lord, including reasonable costs incurred by the landlord in the
eviction process or in selling or storing the property.2 Any notice
of eviction posted by the sheriff must state the rights tenants
have under these new provisions 5 3
B. Condominium and Property Owners Association Acts
1. Meetings, Notice, Direct Communication with Officers, and
Charges for Copies
The Virginia General Assembly enacted numerous amend-
ments to the Condominium2 4 and Property Owners Association255
Acts ("Acts"). "Meeting" is now explicitly defined as a formal
gathering of the executive organ or board of directors where asso-
ciation business is discussed or transacted."6 Both Acts were
amended to prevent the executive organ or board of directors
from using work sessions or other informal gatherings to circum-
vent the open meeting requirements of the Acts.257 The executive
organ or board of directors must publish notice of the time, date,
and place of its meetings in a way reasonably calculated to be
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. §§ 55-79.39 to -79.103 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cur. Supp. 2001).
255. Id. §§ 55-508 to -516.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cure. Supp. 2001).
256. Id. §§ 55-79.41, -509 (Cure. Supp. 2001).
257. Id. § 55-79.75(B), -510.1(A) (Cure. Supp. 2001).
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available to a majority of unit or lot owners, and to mail notice to
any unit or lot owner who requests it."' The executive organ or
board of directors is also required to establish a reasonable, effec-
tive and free method of communication with the owners regarding
any association matters."9 Both acts were amended to limit the
actual cost incurred and the charge the association can assess an
owner or member for copies of association records.26 °
2. Disclosure Packets
The General Assembly also amended the disclosure packet pro-
visions of both Acts."' The purchaser now has the right to request
an update of the condominium resale certificate262 or of the prop-
erty owners' disclosure packet."3 This right must be stated in the
contract.2  Condominium and property owners associations must
provide purchasers with a copy of the notice given to any unit or
lot owner of any current or pending rule or architectural viola-
tion.265 The General Assembly also set forth the fees that condo-
minium and property owners associations may charge for provid-
ing assurances and information.266
C. Easements Conveyed to Public Service Corporations
Under new Virginia Code section 56-259.1,26' no instrument
executed after January 1, 2002, to convey an easement to a public
service corporation shall be accepted for recording unless it con-
tains the following provision:
"NOTICE TO LANDOWNER: You are conveying rights to a public
service corporation. A public service corporation may have the right
258. Id. §§ 55-79.75(B), -510.1A(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
259. Id. § 55-79.75:1, -510.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
260. Id. 88 55-79.74:1(D), -510(D) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
261. See H.B. 2515, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 23,
2001, ch. 556, 2001 Va. Acts 649) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-79.97,
-511, -512 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
262. Id. § 55-79.97(A)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
263. Id. § 55-511(A)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
264. Id. §§ 55-79.97(A)(iv), -511(A)(iv) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
265. Id. § 55-79.97(C)(12), -512(A)(13) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
266. Id. § 55-79.97(D) & (F), -512(B) & (C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
267. Id. § 56-259.1 (Cur. Supp. 2001).
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to obtain some or all of these rights through exercise of eminent do-
main. To the extent that any of the rights being conveyed are not
subject to eminent domain, you have the right to choose not to con-
vey those rights and you could not be compelled to do so. You have
the right to negotiate compensation for any rights that you are vol-
untarily conveying."
268
However, if the instrument does not contain this provision and is
accepted for recording, the absence of the provision will not affect
the validity or enforceability of the instrument.269
The General Assembly also amended Virginia Code section 56-
259 to eliminate any implied distinction between easements and
rights of way by changing "easement or right-of-way" to "ease-
ment of right-of-way."2 0 A new paragraph was added to this sec-
tion which allows a locality in which a gas pipeline or electrical
transmission line would be located to direct the commission to
consider directing a joint use of the right of way.27 1
D. Time-Share Act
1. Exchange Programs and Incidental Benefits
The Assembly made numerous amendments to the Virginia
Real Estate Time-Share Act. 2 Under the amended act, an ex-
change program may not involve either an incidental benefit or
an exchange for another time-share within either the same pro-
ject or another project owned in part by the developer. 3 The
definition of "incidental benefit" was amended to include "ex-
change rights, travel insurance, bonus weeks, upgrade entitle-
ments, travel coupons, referral awards, and golf and tennis pack-
ages."274
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. § 56-259 editor's note (Cum. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
271. Id. § 56-259(D) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
272. Id. §§ 55-360 to -400 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
273. Id. § 55-362 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
274. Id.
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2. Developer Control and Collection of Maintenance Fees
The developer control provision in Virginia Code section 55-
369211 was amended to provide that while the property is in the
developer control period, all costs belong to the developer unless
the time share instrument requires that they be paid by the time-
share estate owners 6.2 " The definition of "time share estate occu-
pancy expenses" was expanded to include the costs incurred in
forming, organizing, and operating the time-share association, fil-
ing fees and annual registration charges, counsel and accountant
fees, and reserves for any cost or expenses .2 " The developer may
collect an annual or specially assessed maintenance fee from each
time-share owner.27" The board of directors may, on behalf of the
developer or on its own account, collect this maintenance fee.
27 9
An association has a lien on every time-share estate for unpaid
and past due maintenance fees.210 An association also has four
years, rather than one year, to perfect its liens.281' The Assembly
has required that certain technical information be included in the
memorandum filed to perfect liens, such as other expenses or fees
the owner owes and contact information for the association's trus-
tee.2
82
E. Joint Tenancy
Virginia Code section 55-20.1" was amended to provide for the
ownership of real or personal property as joint tenants with or
without a right of survivorship. 2' Although the Assembly did not
define "joint tenancy without a right of survivorship," its deletion
of the right to own property as tenants in common from section
55-20.1 suggests that the "joint tenancy without right of survivor-
ship" replaces the former tenancy in common. Section 55-20.1
275. Id. § 55-369 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
276. Id. § 55-369(A) (Cur. Supp. 2001).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. § 55-370(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
280. Id. § 55-370(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
28L Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. § 55-20.1 (Cu. Supp. 2001).
284 Id.
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now does not apply to multiple party accounts under sections 6.1-
125.1 through 6.1-125.16.. or to any other matter specifically
governed by another code provision.8 6 Provisions governing ten-
ancies by the entirety were removed from sections 55-20.1 and 55-
21 and codified as new section 55-20.2.287
F. Eminent Domain
1. Municipalities' Extraterritorial Exercise of Eminent Domain
Power
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 15.2-
190128 to provide that any locality may acquire property outside
its boundaries by eminent domain only if a general law or special
act has expressly conferred such authority.29 However, cities and
towns are expressly given this authority for the purposes set forth
in Virginia Code section 15.2-2109.2 0
2. Redevelopment and Housing Authorities/ADR
Virginia Code section 36-27,291 which governs the eminent do-
main power of redevelopment and housing authorities, was
amended to authorize, for the purpose of facilitating settlement,
voluntary, non-binding alternative dispute resolution after an au-
thority makes its price offer.292 The Code contains two versions of
section 36-27 that are slightly different; one is effective until July
1, 2002, and the other is effective thereafter.293 The version effec-
285. Id. §§ 6.1-125.1 to -125.16 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
286. Id. § 55-20.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
287. See id. § 55-20.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
288. Id. § 15.2-1901 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
289. Id. § 15.2-1901(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
290. Virginia Code section 15.2-2109 empowers a locality to acquire, establish, or con-
trol waterworks, sewerage, gas works, electric plants, public mass transportation systems,
stormwater management systems, and other public utilities, including a limited right to
exceed territorial boundaries to engage in these activities. Id. § 15.2-2109 (Cum. Supp.
2001).
291. Id. § 36-27 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
292. Id. § 36-27(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
293. Compare id. § 36-27 (Cum. Supp. 2001) (effective until July 1, 2002), with id. § 36-
27 (Cum. Supp. 2001) (effective July 1, 2002).
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tive until July 1, 2002, provides that the party requesting the al-
ternative dispute resolution must pay the costs of the hearing,
unless the parties agree to share the costs, while the version ef-
fective July 1, 2002, contains no provision regarding payment of
costs.2 94 The earlier version requires that the ADR proceeding
must be requested and occur at least thirty days prior to the just
compensation trial, while the latter version inexplicably requires
only that the proceeding occur, but not that it be requested,
within those thirty days.295
3. Redevelopment Plans
The Assembly made extensive alterations to Virginia Code sec-
tion 36-51,296 which governs redevelopment plans. Municipalities
must reaffirm their approval of redevelopment plans by resolu-
tion between thirty and thirty-six months after approval.29 7 If the
municipality does not reaffirm the plan, a property owner must
consent to the taking of any property within the redevelopment
plan that has not been acquired, or for which a condemnation pe-
tition has not been filed prior to the termination date of the
plan.29 If, prior to the termination date, either party submits a
mediation request pursuant to Virginia Code section 36-27,299 the
authority's right to file a condemnation petition for that property
shall extend for six months after the termination date. 00
If, on the other hand, the redevelopment plan is reaffirmed, the
municipality may exercise its eminent domain authority over
land within the redevelopment plan until the fifth anniversary of
the approval date.3' A property owner must consent to the taking
of any property within the redevelopment plan that has not been
acquired or for which a condemnation petition has not been filed
294. Compare id. § 36-27(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001) (effective until July 1, 2002), with id. §
36-27(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001) (effective July 1, 2002).
295. Compare id. § 36-27(C) (Cure. Supp. 2001) (effective until July 1, 2002), with id. §
36-27 (Cum. Supp. 2001) (effective July 1, 2002).
296. Id. § 36-51 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
297. Id. § 36-51(B) (Cur. Supp. 2001).
298. Id.
299. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
300. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-51(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
301. Id. § 36-51(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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prior to the fifth anniversary of the approval date.312 If, prior to
the fifth anniversary of the approval date, either party submits a
mediation request pursuant to Virginia Code section 36-27, °3 the
authority's right to file a petition in condemnation relating to that
property shall extend for six months after the fifth anniversary of
the approval date.0 4
Municipalities may adopt new redevelopment plans which des-
ignate a redevelopment area that includes property formerly
situated in a previous redevelopment area in a prior plan.0 5 If the
authority decides not to acquire property after making a purchase
offer, it must reimburse the owner the reasonable expenses in-
curred in connection with the proposed acquisition, including at-
torney, appraiser, or expert fees.30 6 To be reimbursed for ex-
penses, the owner must make a written request to the authority
no later than one year after the date of the authority's written no-
tice of its decision not to acquire the property.30 7
G. Real Estate Taxes
The House of Delegates resolved, with the concurrence of the
Senate, that an amendment to the Virginia Constitution be re-
ferred to the General Assembly at the first regular session held
after the next general election of members of the House.30 ' The
proposed amendment is to Article X, section 6(a),0 9 which lists
property that is exempt from state and local taxes. This section
currently provides an exemption for property used for religious,
charitable, patriotic, historical, benevolent, cultural, or public
park and playground purposes as provided by a three-fourths vote
of the General Assembly. 3 0 The amendment would divest the As-
sembly of the authority to set this exemption and instead base it
302. Id.
303. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
304. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-51(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
305. Id. § 36-51(D) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
306. Id. § 36-51(E) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
307. Id.
308. H.J. Res. 503, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Feb. 22,
2001, ch. 786, 2001 Va. Acts 1074).
309. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6(a).
310. Id. art. X, § 6(a)(6).
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on ordinances adopted by the local governing body, subject to re-
strictions provided by general law.31'
The General Assembly also enacted several minor provisions
regarding real estate taxes. If both a county and a town receive
proceeds from a sale of real estate for delinquent taxes, they will
divide the surplus pro rata, based on the relative amount of pro-
ceeds received by each.312 The Assembly limited the recordation
tax on leases of outdoor advertisement signs to twenty-five dol-
lars when the permit fees have been paid to the Virginia Depart-
ment of Transportation.313 Because the state recordation and
grantor's taxes are based on the consideration paid for the prop-
erty, the consideration must be stated on the deed, although fail-
ure to do so will not invalidate the deed or make it ineligible for
recording.314
H. Voluntary Downzoning
The Assembly amended Virginia Code section 15.2-2286311 to
authorize zoning ordinances that allow a locality and landowner
to agree to downzone the landowner's undeveloped or underde-
veloped property in exchange for a tax credit equal to the excess
real estate taxes the owner has paid due to the higher zoning
classification.316
I. Recording Fees
The General Assembly changed the fees collected by circuit
court clerks for recording deeds of ten or fewer pages to fifteen
dollars; for recording deeds of elven to thirty pages to thirty dol-
lars; and for recording deeds of thirty-one or more pages to fifty
311. H.J. Res. 503, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001).
312. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3967 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
313. Id. § 58.1-807(E) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
314. Id. §§ 58.1-801(A), -802(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
315. Id. § 15.2-2286 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
316. Id. § 15.2-2286(A)(11) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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dollars.317 One dollar and fifty cents of the fee collected will be
used to preserve the permanent records of the circuit court.31
J. Lien Creditor's Release
Virginia Code section 55-66.3(A)(1)319 was amended to provide
that a creditor who must record a certificate of partial or full sat-
isfaction may do so by hand or by mailing the certificate by certi-
fied mail, return receipt requested, to the clerk's office.3
317. Id. § 17.1-275(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
318. Id.
319. Id. § 55-66.3(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
320. Id.
